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JUDGING RELIGION*
WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN**
I teach in a department of religion at a small liberal arts college. A
couple of years ago, my department had a meeting with the graduating
senior majors in which they were asked a series of questions evaluating
their experiences as majors. After a long and mostly positive
assessment of their experience, the head of the department asked the
seniors what the department's reputation was among students at the
college outside the department. The student response was immediate
and emphatic. One student announced that the department was
perceived as a place for Christian proselytizing. Another announced-
equally emphatically-that the department was perceived as a place
where religion was debunked.
One of the difficulties with the contemporary public conversation
about religion, in religious studies and legal circles, is that these two
options are viewed by many people as being the only possible
scenarios.' Is this the choice? Is the choice between trying to sell
religion or trying to sell out religion? Or are there other options?
Many of us in religious studies are trying to do a third thing which
* This article discusses proceedings in a case brought under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 bb et seq. (1993), which has subsequently been
held to be unconstitutional in Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). While I would argue
that the opinion for the Court and the concurring opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia
support to some extent the argument of this article, the issues raised by it are no means
wholly disposed of by that decision. This is so in part because of widespread opposition to the
decision, but also because of related questions in the interpretation of the First Amendment
and the free exercise provisions of state constitutions. Further, there are those who argue
that the standard in RFRA was simply a legislative enactment of the appropriate standard
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 2157 (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
Earlier versions of this paper were prepared for a conference at Western Maryland
College entitled "Reconstructing a History of Religions: Problems and Possibilities," 8-9
November 1996 and for a conference at Marquette University Law School entitled "Religion
and the Judicial Process," 4-5 April 1997. I have benefited from the comments of Alexandra
Brown, Ann Massie, and Barry Sullivan on earlier drafts of this paper.
** Winnifred Fallers Sullivan is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Washington &
Lee University and a member of the Illinois Bar.
1. For a controversial and much discussed article characterizing religious studies in this
way, see CHARLOTTE ALLEN, Is Nothing Sacred?: Casting Out the Gods from Religious
Studies in LINGUA FRANCA 30-40 (1996).
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neither promotes religion in general-or any specific religion, in
particular-nor attempts to dismiss religion as either irrelevant or evil
or as reducible to other human social or cultural phenomena. This third
thing talks about religion as a distinctive but varied and shifting human
social and cultural product. It strives to avoid privileging certain
religious traditions. It respects the integrity of the material while
maintaining enough critical distance to advance human understanding
of religion and its relationship to other cultural and social events. This
third thing is an interdisciplinary and global comparative academic
project that is in conversation with anthropology, sociology, history, and
theology.
I am trained both in law and in religious studies. In this paper I am
going to use religious studies to criticize the legal discourse about
religion in American courts. I will then propose that religious studies
can help lawyers and judges to acknowledge the religiousness of
Americans without establishing it-by recognizing the instability of
religion as a category for American law.
I. LAW AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES
Law and religious studies speak different languages about religion.
To some extent, this difference accounts for the confusion in law about
religious freedom.
Indiscriminate use of the word "religion," as well as other reifying
categories describing religious cultural phenomena-including
Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism-have been widely and
thoroughly criticized in religious studies because their use makes
indefensible claims about the existence of referents for those labels.
The use of these categories fails to acknowledge the historical, cultural
and geographic locatedness of religious experience as well as the vast
differences among and within religious traditions.! The term
"Christianity," for example, is only useful as an extremely general
umbrella term with highly indistinct edges. There are and have been a
wide variety of churches. There are people calling themselves
Christians who share little. There are cultural events that are
distinguishable as having Christian attributes only when compared to
the cultural events of other religions. But, there is no "Christianity" out
2. See WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION: A NEW
APPROACH TO THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF MANKIND (1962); JONATHAN Z. SMITH,
IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN (1982) (presenting two very
different but powerful descriptions of these difficulties of language and definition).
[Vol. 81:441
JUDGING RELIGION'
there. Furthermore, these categories are regarded by scholars of
religion as being the product of the history of modernity. They are seen
as dependent on academic theories produced in those contexts, and
therefore of limited use outside them?
Proposals for remedying this situation include using religion only in
the plural, or only as an adjective: Thus, identifying the area of study as
"history of religions" or "religious studies," rather than "comparative
religion" or, even, simply, "religion." College courses surveying "World
Religions" are out of favor, replaced with courses on approaches to the
study of religion. The research emphasis among scholars of religion in
the last couple of decades entails getting the parts right and examining
the borders rather than finding or constructing new wholes-whether of
religion-in-general or of particular traditions.4
While "religion" and the various religions, as categories, are being
seriously reevaluated in religious studies circles, they are alive and
well-flourishing even-in legal and political contexts. In fact,
"religion" seems to be staging a real comeback in the public realm.
New constitutions are being written guaranteeing or extending religious
rights. Political demands for religious freedom are ubiquitous. The
Prince of Wales is advocating that the English monarchy move from
being Defender of the Faith to Defender of All Faiths. In the United
States, efforts continue in Congress to amend the Constitution to
include more religion.6 The word "religion" is being written into
statutes and used by litigants all over the world. Even law schools have
discovered religion.7
Why is there this imbalance? Why does "religion" and
3. See, e.g., Talal Assad, The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,
in GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY
AND ISLAM (1993).
4. See Gregory D. Alles and Joseph M. Kitagawa, Afterward. The Dialectic of the Parts
and the Whole: Reflections on the Pas Presen and Future of the History of Religions, in THE
HISTORY OF RELIGIONS: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT (Joseph M. Kitagawa ed., 1985);
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Finding a True Story of American Religion: Comments on L.H.
Larue's Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 981 (1996).
5. Fred Barbash, Is the Queen Reinventing Her House? Reports of Royal Revisions Have
Britons Speculating. WASH. POST, August 20,1996, at A13.
6. Rep. Ernest Istook of Oklahoma announced on May 8, 1997, that his proposed
Amendment to the United States Constitution promoting prayer and the rights of religion
has 100 sponsors. The Press Box (visited Jan 22, 1998) httpJ/www.house.gov/istook/rel-
rfa3.htm.
7. In the last twenty years courses in law schools and law review articles about religion
have increased exponentially.
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"Christianity" and "Buddhism" mean less and less in academic circles-
even religious academic circles-and more and more in legal and
political ones? In the American context certainly, but also elsewhere,
use of the word "religion" in public discourse-while always
important-has come to have strident political and legal implications.
To the extent that this political discourse relies on the word "religion"
to carry a useful referent, there is a real question, based on the
experience of the modem study of religion, as to whether the word can
bear the weight that the legal and political context seems to demand of
it.
II. SASNETT V. SULLIVAN
Recently I was asked to serve as an expert witness in a prisoners'
religious rights case-Sasnett v. Sullivan.! I will use my experience in
that case to illustrate the points I wish to make about religion and law in
the United States, and elsewhere.
The action in Sasnett was brought in federal district court in 1994 on
behalf of all of the prisoners in the Wisconsin state correctional system
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).9  The
complaint challenged new regulations limiting both the wearing of
religious jewelry and the number of publications that a prisoner could
keep in his or her cell. The new rules limited publications that could be
kept in a cell to twenty-five, regardless of size or length or content, and
8. 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), cert granted
& vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb(1) (1993). RFRA provided:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-1 (1993).
RFRA was held to be unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157. One
point made by the majority in Boerne is that RFRA had generated a huge number of cases at
the state and local level. Id. at 217. The Brief for Amici States of Ohio, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Territories of American Samoa,
Guam and the Virgin Islands in support of petitioner in Boerne, declared that RFRA
spawned a huge number of prisoner rights cases.
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prohibited the wearing of all religious jewelry except wedding bands
conforming to a particular description. In practice, these new
regulations resulted in the confiscation of some religious publications-
mostly Bible commentaries-and of all crosses or crucifixes on chains.
The stated justification given for the limit on publications was a need to
control clutter and conform to fire codes. Three justifications were
offered for the jewelry prohibition: that religious jewelry could be used
as a weapon; that it invited theft; and that it was used as gang
identification. It was the last that was given most attention at trial. The
trial court held that the jewelry regulation violated RFRA because it
substantially burdened plaintiffs' religious exercise without a
compelling state interest but that the publications limitation did not; the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed."
IlI. WHAT IS A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN TO RELIGION?
As a preliminary matter, RFRA required a finding that there be a
"substantial burden" to "a person's exercise of religion."11  What
qualified as "an exercise of religion?" When was a burden
"substantial?" In Employment Division v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court
decision that precipitated the passage of RFRA, petitioners claimed
that the challenged statute effectively outlawing the sacramental use of
peyote struck right at the heart of their religious exercise and
threatened the continued existence of the Native American Church in
Oregon. Did the burdened practice, under RFRA, have to be as
"central" to the religious tradition in question as the use of peyote
arguably is to the Native American Church in order for the burden to
have been substantial? Did RFRA require such a high standard?
Judge Crabb, the trial court judge in Sasnet, discussed two possible
tests for determining whether the prison regulations substantially
burdened prisoner plaintiffs. 3 Defendant prison officials had argued
that the exercise of a prisoner's religion was substantially burdened only
10. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995), aff'a, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir.
1996). Certiorari was granted in Sasnett but after the Boerne decision, Sasnett was remanded
for further consideration in light of Boerne. Sullivan v. Sasnett, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
On May 5, 1997, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a similar Indiana case,
that defendant Department of Corrections could not prohibit plaintiff, a Native American,
from wearing a medicine bag. Craddick v. Duckworth, 113 F.3d 83 (7th Cir. 1997).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb(1) (1993).
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1991).
13. 908 F. Supp. at 1429.
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
if the prohibited practice was "required by their religion."'4 Because
Christianity did not "require" the wearing of crosses or crucifixes, the
argument went, prohibition of such a practice could not substantially
burden plaintiffs' religious rights. 5 In other words, you could still be a
Christian without wearing one. The attraction of this test was that it
would be an "objective" one-clear and easily applicable. Just find out
what the requirements of the religion are and then you know the range
of permissible regulation.
Plaintiffs argued, on the other hand, that the appropriate test should
be a subjective one-whether the practices are central to, and sincerely
and religiously motivated in terms of, the individual's religious exercise.
The test would be whether particular individuals are substantially
burdened in the exercise of their religion, from their own viewpoint, not
whether a particular practice is central to and mandated by a particular
religion.
These two tests are founded in very different understandings of
what religion is."6 For the defendant prison officials in Sasnett, religion
is imagined as doctrinally definite and authoritatively determined by an
institutional church. Being religious-exercising religion-is being
obedient to the legal prescriptions of that religion. For the plaintiffs, on
the other hand, religion is imagined as personally determined-a matter
of individual choice. Being religious-exercising religion-is about
being faithful to one's own religious understanding.
The two tests invite very different kinds of evidence. A test which
focuses on the mandates of a particular religion depends on expert
testimony to establish the requirements of that religion with respect to a
particular practice. The religious practitioner need only testify
convincingly to membership in a religious community. The expert does
the rest. In Sasnett the expert for defendants offered the following
opinions in her affidavit about what Christianity "required":
Although the term "Christianity" covers a large number of
churches and individual sects, all Christian churches and sects
share certain fundamental characteristics, including the central
principle that salvation, or reparation of the separation of God
14. Id.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. There are other ways of delineating the possible tests under either RFRA or the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as Professor Greenawalt points out in his
comments. See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction,
81 MARQ. L. REv. 461 (1998). These are the two considered by the court in Sasnett v.
Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. at 1440-44.
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and human beings, is a spiritual gift of God given through Jesus
Christ...
I am not aware of any Christian churches or sects that hold that
the wearing or use of a particular artifact is a necessary condition
for salvation. In fact such a claim would be theologically
problematic within the Christian framework, since it would
invite, if not entail, a preoccupation with the artifacts that would
distort or reduce the primary focus on God's saving activity...
In my opinion, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty,
the policy prohibiting the wearing of jewelry in prison does not
inhibit conduct that manifests a central tenet of the plaintiffs'
religions, as referenced above; nor does it prevent plaintiffs from
engaging in conduct mandated by their religion.'
With respect to the limitation on the number of publications,
defendants' expert testified that she knew "of no Christian sect for
which any religious text other than the Holy Bible is central to the
practice of the religion. ' ..
For defendants' expert, "Christianity" is about the "spiritual" gift of
salvation and does not involve "artifacts." "Christianity" is about a
"focus on God's saving activity." It is about belief-belief in a
particular religious understanding of salvation. 9 And the tenets of
"Christianity" can be definitively stated. Nowhere in her affidavit did
defendants' expert reveal any uncertainty about the possibility of
defining the "fundamental characteristics" of "Christianity" or about
the appropriate authority to look to in determining such questions. She
seemed unselfconscious about the mainstream Protestant bias and
iconoclasm evident in her opinion-a bias which favors a concern with a
particular understanding of the nature of salvation-based in faith and
word. She also seems apparently unaware of the many Christian
theologies which have existed across space and time and which continue
to be created which diverge from hers. An objective test demands such
doctrinally certain and inevitably sectarian evidence.
A subjective test, on the other hand, relies primarily on the
17. Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (affidavit
of Karen L. Carr).
18. Id
19. Interestingly, this dichotomy between belief and practice set up by the defendants'
expert is exactly parallel to the dichotomy in Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which he used to deny protection to peyote use. Id. at 874-90.
This dichotomy which is, in turn, taken from Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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testimony of the lay religious practitioner. She is, in a sense, the expert
on her own religious life. My expert testimony for the Sasnett plaintiffs
challenged the implication in defendants' argument that religious
jewelry could never be central to a person's religious practice. I
testified that, on the contrary, religion scholars generally were of the
opinion that material objects could be central to a person's practice of
his religion and that a person could be substantially burdened in the
practice of his religion if religious objects were denied him.' I also
testified that it was not possible to identify fundamental characteristics
that were common to all Christians.21
Both the trial court and appellate judges looked to the testimony of
the prisoners themselves to determine the effect on religion of the new
regulations under RFRA. Judge Crabb held, and Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit panel, concurred, that the appropriate test was
whether the burdened practice was motivated by sincere religious belief
on the part of the individual, not whether or not it was ecclesially
mandated." Both courts held that prohibiting the wearing of crosses
substantially burdened plaintiffs' exercise of religion.
For religion scholars, both tests raise a host of troublesome issues of
definition. The judges and lawyers, and even some of the scholarly
experts in Sasnett, seem oblivious to the difficulties of defining religious
orthodoxy and to the theological implications inherent in such questions
as the centrality of a particular religious practice or whether an
individual or some religious institution should be the location of
religious authority. For example, Judge Crabb commented that her
choice of an individual motivation test allowed her to "avoid becoming
embroiled in questions of theology."' In fact, theological questions are
begged throughout the testimony and opinions in Sasnett.
The decision by both courts does seem ultimately a culturally
20. For scholarly work on religious jewelry, see Theodor H. Gaster, Amulets and
Talismans, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987); Diana Lee James,
Jewelry, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987), JEWELRY 7000 YEARS:
AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND ILLUSTRATED SURVEY FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF
THE BRITISH MUSEUM (Hugh Tait ed., 1986). For scholarly work on the general importance
of objects in religious life, see Sasnett v. Sullivan, F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (references
cited in the Expert Report of Winnifred Fallers Sullivan).
21. See id.; see also Jonathan Z. Smith, Fences and Neighbors: Some Contours of Early
Judaism, in IMAGINING RELIGION 1-18 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1982) (discussion of the
difficulties inherent in the project of finding limiting characteristics in defining a religious
community).
22. Sasnett, 908 F. Supp. at 1444; see also Sasnett, 91 F. 3d at 1022.
23. Id. at 1444.
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coherent one in terms of American religious history. While both tests,
as presented in this case, have a Protestant bias-the objective test
because of its focus on belief and the subjective test because of its focus
on the individual-neither test is surprising given American religious
history. The centrality of individual belief is, both in constitutional and
religious terms, very American. The right to religious freedom is
viewed as belonging to the individual and the religious object is viewed
only in the primary context of the individual's relationship to God.
Judge Crabb concluded that "[t]he undisputed facts show that wearing a
cross played an important role in the individual faiths of plaintiffs. '
While the court claims that there are religious practices that would not
meet the subjective test, it is hard to see how the line could be drawn as
long as the witness seemed sincerely motivated in his practice.
But this focus on individual belief is not the only way to understand
religion, faith or religious freedom. In many religious traditions, the
needs and identity of the community would take precedence and
religious practice would play a bigger role. Religious communities with
tightly formed authority and creeds may place a lower valence on
individual conscience and belief. Salvation may be understood in
material or communal terms. Religious communities and institutions
do not play an important role in the courts' determinations in Sasnett.
There is a hint of anti-Catholicism and Protestant establishment both in
plaintiffs' expert's iconoclastic rejection of the importance of religious
objects as well as in her failure to acknowledge as essential for
Christians any religious texts beyond the Bible; the Book of Mormon
and Mary Baker Eddy's Science and Health are two obvious examples.
Is it possible to articulate a test under RFRA that is not either
suspect as a religious establishment or so hopelessly subjective as to be
meaningless? What role can/should religious studies play in all of this?
While religious studies can inform courts about the range of religious
practice, it is less suited to providing the kind of stable definitions laws
like RFRA seem to demand. The pitfalls of any expert testimony are
legion and well documented.' They are increased when dealing with
people as tangentially related to community of any kind as are the
plaintiffs in Sasnett. Let us now turn to those witnesses and their
testimony about religion.
24. Id. at 1445.
25. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 555,555-78 (1977).
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
IV. Is THiS RELIGION AT ALL?
One value of studying religion in a prison is that it is not possible to
pick one's informants and the informants you get are not, by and large,
like St. Paul or Malcolm X, religious virtuosos. They are people who
are marginally competent at everything in their lives-that is why they
are there-but whose witness is often affecting and poignant. Listen to
some of the plaintiffs in this case:
Sylvester Sasnett:
I belong to a nondenominational church in Waukesha,
Wisconsin, Truth Bible Church .... Truth Bible Church is a
church that is a nondenominational church that has-it believes
in the truth. It believes in the word of God as being the sole
counsel, the sole means and direction for a man to live. They are
not organized with any established religion. They are not
controlled by any established, organized religion .... The cross
had an importance because it represented whom I believe in,
who I trust in, who I want my life to be patterned by .... The
crucifix that I sent out was one that I wore around my neck, to
always hold close to my heart and identify with the church and
society, and I held that close to me. It was always a reminder of
who I am and Christ .... I'm not a Catholic and the rules of my
church do not allow [a rosary] .... Because we don't associate
with other religious paraphernalia ... no one knows what Christ
looked like. So to have a picture of it would be kind of really
ridiculous. However, a cross with the image of Christ on it
represents that Christ died on Calvary for our sins. I wear it
close to my bosom because I identify with it. Its a reminder. It
helps to keep in check my character, the way I act around prison
staff, the way I act around other inmates ... what it does is it's a
point of reference for me. It is something that was not only given
to me as a gift from my mother, but always having something
around my neck and seeing it as I undressed and went to bed
with it on at night always caused me to be thankful to God that I
didn't die from my cancer, that I was safe in prison, that I had a
new life and it was not wasted as it was before .... I'm not
Baptist. I'm not Lutheran. I'm not Presbyterian. I'm a child of
God. I'm a Christian.
Lonnie Smith:
[I]t was a gift to me because my friend knew that I was a
Christian, and she gave it to me as a gift. When she gave it to
me, it meant the world to me. Once I put it on, I said I wasn't
going to never take it off. I had it blessed and everything .... I
[Vol. 81:441
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write songs for the church. I have played in the band. I go to
bible studies and stuff like that. My family, some was-they had
all different religions. I got brothers that go under Muslims. I
got sisters that are Christians, some that are-they got their own
different style .... I don't look at Lutheran, Christians, all these
other names. I don't even look at that as being different. I just
believe in God and go to church. I don't really go by names ...
[my religion] requires me to wear it because it's a big part of-
it's a big part of my religion, because when I wear this, it's like I
have God like right here with me, you know. It's like I'm
carrying him around everywhere I go. And when they took it
away from me, it was like taking everything away from me, my
whole life basically. It's very important to me because that's the
only thing I have in here.
James Lowery:
Several doctors have diagnosed me as suffering from multiple
personality disorder. Several of the different personalities have
different religious beliefs. The primary belief is Christian ...
there is a Catholic American Indian one, Baptist, Pentecostal,
American Indian. One is satanic. There's agnostics, different
beliefs.
Barbara Miller:
I have been a Wells Synod Lutheran my whole life. There's
nothing saying you have to wear the cross, but it brings a person
closer to God ... having a cross around your neck-when you are
someplace during the day and you want to pray, you pick up that
cross and hold it in your hand .... You don't define a Christian. I
wouldn't think you would. You can pretty well tell by their
actions if they are a Christian, and in their behavior.'
"It's a point of reference for me." "It's like I have God right here
with me." "It brings a person closer to God." For these prisoners,
religious jewelry seems to provide an anchor. It locates their religious
life. It is part of what might be called the "folk practice" of religion.
But is it, or should it be, constitutionally or legislatively protected?
How do you go about deciding whether the religious practice of
these people is "substantially burdened" by having the crosses taken
away from them? If we disallow defendants' expert's definition of
Christianity as hopelessly parochial and elitist, where do we begin to
26. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (emphasis added).
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find another? Are these people Christians just because they say they
are? Are their practices important to their religion just because they
say they are? How borderline would a practice have to be before it
would stop being Christian? Or stop being religious? One advantage of
a religious establishment is that you can ask the authorities.' Without a
religious establishment there is no way of making these determinations.
All we have is a set of divergent opinions about religion and religious
practice and no way of adjudicating among them. Justice Jackson
summed up the American attitude in Bamette: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein." It is not only ideologically prohibited. It is also
practically messy and difficult, even for religious establishments, as
years of heresy trials attest to.
Defendants' lawyer pressed each prisoner to identify herself
denominationally. He also pressed plaintiffs' expert on prison
administration to agree that the best regulatory approach would be to
make a list of religious groups and their requirements that could be
used by prison officials. Plaintiffs' expert on prisons, Walter Dickey, a
law professor at the University of Wisconsin, formerly a prison
administrator, resisted the ideas that better categories and clearer rules
were the solution:
I think gangs are a legitimate concern ... although one has to,
you know, define what one's talking about, because a religious
group can be a gang without any illegal purpose, in fact, with the
best possible purposes in the world ... I think there are some
legitimate interests advanced by religion. Part of the prisons
have long, long histories of trying to promote religion, probably
in violation of the First Amendment. And I think religion does a
lot of good things for prisoners and a lot of good things for
institutions. And I think you really want to be very careful in
limiting religious activities, religious symbols, when there are so
many benefits to them and their return, in terms of control of
illegal activity, is so slight, if there's any return at all ... It seems
to me people, in the exercise, of their religion, have the right to
have objects, medals and rosaries and things that Indian people
have. I don't know enough about all the variety of religions to
27. In the United Kingdom, for example, bishops sit on ecclesiastical cases in the high
court just for that purpose.
28. West Virginia State Bd. Of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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say what all of those things would be ... I think that people,
whether they are in prison or not in prison, have the right to
exercise and practice their religion. And if that means for them
the having of some religious symbols and the wearing of them, it
seems to me, within appropriate kinds of limits, not only should
we permit it, but maybe we should encourage it. And we
encourage all kinds of other religious stuff. I mean, we are
promoting it all the time, spending a lot of the state's money on
it, frankly. That's who pays the chaplains and all the other
religious leaders ... I remember one [religious claim] ... a guy
from Sheboygan who said he was Jewish and he wanted to have
a Jewish dinner at Christmastime, or not Christmastime, at Rosh
Hashanah or whatever it was. And he invited Linda Rivas, who
happens to be Jewish, to it and they had a dinner for two people
because he was the only Jewish inmate in the system. And I had
to decide whether he was really Jewish, and I decided he was ... I
figured the guy had five life sentences, we could cut him a little
slack, since he obviously wasn't Jewish or if he was, he was a
very recent convert. He just wanted to have his own dinner.29
Asked whether it would be a good idea if the prison chaplains sat down
and listed the essential elements of each religion, Dickey said: "I
wouldn't trust the prison chaplains ... First of all, they're very much tied
into just traditional religion. They view a lot of nontraditional religion
as competition. We fought about this all the time. They basically want
everybody to be a Catholic, Jew or Protestant."' Defendants' lawyer
conducting this deposition became more and more confused. He could
not see how you could make rules if everyone got to make up his own
religion.
The difficulties of tightly defining the borders of religion and
religious practice are familiar to religion scholars. Religions have a way
of blending into one another and religion has a way of blending into
other categories. Given the inarticulate neediness and shifting religious
identities of the prisoners in this case-or of anyone-how are their
religious lives given the stable identities that experts and lawyers want?
Dickey has a different approach. He seems comfortable with fewer
hard borders. For him, based on considerable experience, religion in
prison is generally a good thing in almost whatever form it takes. It
should be encouraged and the definition should be broad. Limitations
should be based on genuine security considerations and fairness.
29. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908. F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (deposition of Walter J.
Dickey).
30. Id.
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Lawyers and many current prison administrators, on the other hand,
keep pressing for tests and definitions so that rights can be definitively
and appropriately allocated.
V. INDETERMINACY
The amorphous quality of the religious lives of the witnesses in
Sasnett is not easily susceptible to categorical definition. The witnesses
are sincere (no one is arguing otherwise) but it is hard to give content to
what they are sincere about. They present the extreme case. However,
to a lesser extent the religious lives of most Americans-maybe most
people-could be seen to have similar qualities. Most people have a
complex and changing relationship to one or more religious traditions.
They simply do not fit neatly into a model which could be labeled
"Presbyterian" or "Buddhist" or "Black Muslim." Anyone who has
been a member of a religious community recognizes this problem. One
sometimes has less in common with those one sits next to at a worship
service than those one encounters in other parts of one's life. Even the
tightest religious communities are riven with profound theological
differences. What is needed is a theory of religion that can take account
of these difficulties and provide a language about religion that will serve
lawyers and judges.
Lawrence Rosen, the legal anthropologist, has made the case in two
recent articles in a different context that, rather than trying to pin
cultural forms like religion into brittle crystalline structures-structures
that do not correspond to the experience of real people-we should
acknowledge cultural indeterminacy and focus our attention rather on
how to deal with that indeterminacy. In other words, rather than trying
to fit people and their religious lives into hard-edged categories, courts
should affirm and give value to an American style of engagement with
cultural difference.
In an article on Edwards v. Aguillard,3' Rosen has proposed that the
majority opinion striking down a Louisiana creationism law is best
understood as one that furthers the very American goal of "continuing
the conversation."32 Plaintiffs in Edwards challenged a statute requiring
31. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
32. Lawrence Rosen, Continuing the Conversation: Creationism, the Religion Clauses,
and the Politics of Culture. 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 82-83. Other works addressing the
indeterminacy of cultural forms are James Clifford's analysis of a Massachusetts case about
Indian land rights. See James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in THE PREDICAMENT OF
CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); see also
HARJOT OBEROI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS BOUNDARIES (1994).
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that high school biology courses that teach evolution give equal time to
creation science.33 The defenders of the statute argued that creationism
is a scientific theory, not religious doctrine, that it is entitled to the same
respect as other scientific theories, and that academic freedom inheres
in students, not teachers.' 4 Those challenging the statute argued that
creation science was religion, not science. 5 Justice Brennan's majority
opinion striking down the statute as an establishment of religion is
founded, as Rosen sees it, in its understanding of science as provisional
and falsifiable.36 The problem with teaching creationism-the problem
with teaching religious doctrine-is not that it is religious but that it is
closed and not open to discussion. The best approach, that of the
Majority, as Rosen sees it, is to view the appropriate relationship of
knowledge to power in such a case as being one of dialogue and process,
rather than understanding the choice as being between national or local
control of the curriculum. 7 By imagining science as neutral, the
majority's decision encourages continued conversation: "The
assessment of harm turns in no small part in these cases, then, on an
assessment of whether a given practice will join people in common
experiences through which a shared set of orientations can be
engendered or whether it further separates people into their respective
enclaves."
31
Without being naive or overly idealistic about the openness of the
scientific process, one can see the Court's decision, Rosen argues, in the
context of a larger cultural commitment to democratic values:
The Court is, in essence, setting the terms of the conversation. It
does so when it supports the image of science as neutral and the
exchange of ideas as necessitating a willingness to give and take.
It does so, too, when it supports the idea that the centers of
power in American life are multiple and dispersed. The harm
the courts seek to protect against is harm to the process by which
differences can be stated without the legitimacy of the state being
placed at risk. It may do no harm to such a goal, however, for
the courts to acknowledge that science is a domain the courts.
should leave undefined or to acknowledge that while the forum
is indeed one in which others must accept the courts' idea of
33. 107 S. Ct. at 2573 (1987).
34. Id.
35. 1d.
36. See Rosen, supra note 32, at 82-83.
37. Id at 78-79.
38. Id.
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what makes for a conversation, the nature of that conversation
will itself not be subject to a fixed definition."
In cases of cultural conflict, attention to key American themes such as
the marketplace of ideas and a notion of give-and-take come closer to
some sort of cultural justice, in Rosen's view, than would a push for
doctrinal rules based in hard ideological positions for or against
particular curricular content.4°
The best in judicial opinion writing in cases involving cultural
conflict engages in what Rosen calls a kind of "socio-logic":
41
If ... one thinks of a principle, in the context of the jurisprudence
of religion, as the articulation of standards of legitimate conduct
as evinced in a number of cultural domains, one can see that it is
a socio-logic that is involved here-an attempt in a
heterogeneous society to maintain concurrence among concepts
whose very power lies in their inherent, indeed necessary
openendedness .... [C]ultural forms possess an inherent
indeterminacy, a capacity for creating bonds of relationship
through passing acquaintance, an ability to hold diverse groups
together by means of common symbols imprecisely fixed ... and
the sense that one makes of a body of decisions will be seriously
truncated if the localized form of cultural knowledge is
measured against the inappropriate standard of philosophic logic
alone.
The inherent indeterminacy of cultural forms, such as the religious
identities in Sasnett, only reinforces the wisdom of this position.
In a subsequent article4 Rosen further demonstrates this socio-logic
and elaborates on the notion of the indeterminacy of culture by
suggesting that instead of using metaphors for culture that suggest order
and regularity, it might be more accurate and more fruitful to borrow
metaphors that attempt to account for ambiguity, indeterminacy and
uncertainty. He mentions scientific models such as chaos theory,
39. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. James Boyd White has also proposed that legal reform be focused on the quality
of legal discourse, rather than on the formulation of better rules-rules that today are often
based on economic analysis and the rigid anthropology often implied thereby. See, e.g., THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION
(1973) and JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
(1990).
42. Rosen, supra note 32, at 82-83.
43. Lawrence Rosen, The Integrity of Cultures, 34 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 594,
594-617 (1991).
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amorphous solids, or fuzzy logic.'M He then draws from his own study of
Morocco to suggest that what most characterizes Moroccan society is a
cultural style of negotiability, a style which embodies a certain
ambiguity and allows for a necessary flexibility.45
While it is necessary to understanding Moroccan culture to
understand such indigenous legal concepts as nafs, 'aqel and haqq,
among others, it is in the use of these concepts in the context of
establishing and reestablishing a network of relations with others that
most typifies Moroccan society:
What results, then, is a view of Moroccans as constantly engaged
in bargaining out their relationships with one another, using as
much information as they can to assess the way another is most
likely to be attached to others and most likely to affect oneself
... It is small wonder, in so personalistic a universe, that, as T. E.
Lawrence put it generally, "Arabs believe in individuals, not
institutions.""M
What Rosen understands Moroccans to share is not simply a set of
structured symbols such as the legal concepts listed above, but, more
importantly, a common orientation to a shifting set of symbols. Rosen's
work implies that it is not just Moroccans that are best understood
through attention to cultural style. We also are best understood that
way.' What makes America work is the democratic conversation, not a
uniform commitment to shared symbols and values. For Rosen, the
Court is at its best when it facilitates that conversation.
Rosen's focus on cultural style is something like what Walter
Dickey, the prison expert in Sasnett, was advocating for prisons. In his
testimony the common ground is not rules that are uniformly applied
but a process which can make a prison work, a process of negotiation
and adaptability which understands the need for security, but which also
attempts both to treat prisoners fairly and equally and yet has room for
the occasional lifer who needs to have a Seder. This flexibility is not
cynical but comes out of a real respect for the individual and for cultural
difference: An acknowledgment of an American cultural style in the
case of cultural conflict. By stepping one step back from the project of
44. Id.
45. LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING FOR REALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY (1984).
46. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN
ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989).
47. Rosen acknowledges a strong debt to an influential theory of practice in PIERRE
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
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writing rules to define cultural norms, courts (and maybe prison
officials) can do what they do best-insist on procedural fairness and
enforce constitutional commitments to a government of the people.
VI. LAW AND RELIGION
We have moved in the last six years from the apparent absurdity of
Smith in which constitutional protection for the free exercise of religion
did not extend to the sacramental core of an historically oppressed
people's religious life to the apparent absurdity of giving a legislative
veto to any who claims a religious motive. It is not clear that this is
progress. If we are to "continue the conversation" we need a better
language about religion and religious difference.
Focusing on legal and political settings in studying religion has a
democratizing effect. The collaborative process of constitution making,
of legislation, and of courtroom procedure presents cases about religion
in the lives of ordinary Americans and permits the supposed objects of
our study to be part of the scholarly project. Instead of a language
about religion and religious practice based only on the lives and mostly
theoretical writing of religious professionals, there can be a give and
take between the actual religious lives of ordinary people and the
language of legal and religious studies. And our focus can be on the
justice of the process rather than on control of the categories.
Focusing on process will not solve the problem of defining religion.
In fact, labeling religion as indeterminate might properly be understood
in itself as a theological statement. Any sustained treatment of religion
implies a theology. Because the language of religious studies is largely
inherited from the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and is
implicated thereby in the central theological questions and positions of
that time, it is in some ways suited to conversation with contemporary
law, which finds many of its antecedents in that period and that
conversation as well. Focusing on process may allow a respect-on the
part of law-for the individual and for cultural difference rather than
for religion.
The democratic give and take of political debate about the role of
religion in a free pluralistic society can be seen in constitutional debates
around the world, a debate which continually subverts the boundaries of
legislatively and judicially created categories. In the new South Africa
the religion provisions of the new constitution have been debated on
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the Internet by all interested comers." Religion has been both
oppressor and liberator so passions run high. In Chiapas, in Southern
Mexico, debate occurs in modern Mayan communities seeking to
preserve their traditions as to whether they are better served by
demanding the right to cultural independence or the right to religious
freedom.49 Understanding themselves as dedicated to preserving a
culture allows Mayans certain rights as a community over dissenting
individuals which the language of religious freedom does not permit,
because religious freedom in Mexico is a right that belongs to an
individual. Indian communities, like other small insular religious
communities, like Hasidic communities, wish to be able to discipline
their members for heterodoxy.-" They cannot do that if a member can
assert an individual right to religious liberty.
The goal of religious studies in the academic, legal, and political
context, as well as in a scholarly setting, is to develop a common
discourse about religion and religious difference. A discourse that
makes careful distinctions but that does not pull rank when confronted
with evidence such as that which was offered in the Sasnett case-one
that allows for the inherent indeterminacy of culture. This project is an
urgent contemporary global task, one that requires a thorough
understanding of religious history-perhaps in this country most
urgently of the Reformation-but one that also sees its job in the
context of wider contemporary debates about constructing a just
society. To return to our two students and their reporting of the
reputation of our department. Religious pluralism should not mean
that either colleges or courts must choose between promoting religion
or suppressing it, but should be seen as an opportunity to "continue the
conversation." Legislative and constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the free exercise of religion may not be the best way of furthering
democratic goals in a pluralistic society."
48. Christine M. Hart, From Apartheid to Democracy: Religion and Law in a Changing
South Africa, MICHIGAN INTERNATIONAL LAWYER § 26-30 (1996).
49. Personal conversations with author in August 1995 during a visit to Chiapas. Susan
Staiger Gooding has studied the ways in which Indian communities in the Northwest have
used the courtroom as a location for exploring and creating identity. Susan Staiger Gooding,
Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities, in UNITED STATES V. OREGON,
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION, PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR, 28 L
& Soc'Y REV. 1181 (1994).
50. For discussion of a recent United States Supreme Court case about a Hasidic
community see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Competing Theories of Religion and Law in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An Hasidic Case, 43 NUMEN 184,184-212 (1996).
51. At the end of his comments on this paper, Professor Greenawalt concluded that the
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troublesome situation of judicial definition of religion is preferable to no free exercise rights.
Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 472. I am not so convinced.
Professor Smith has substantially revised his response to my paper since the conference
so I have not had time to fully respond to his many thoughtful points. See Rodney K. Smith,
Responding to the Supreme Court's Effort to End the Conversation About Religious
Exemptions and Welcoming Professor Sullivan into the Conversation, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 487
(1998). I do want to emphasize several differences that we seem to have. Professor Smith
assumes that I am of the opinion that religious behavior, whether institutionally compelled or
privately motivated, should be constitutionally or legislatively protected. Id. at 503. I am
highly skeptical that that can be fairly done because of the instability of the category of
religion, as I have tried to demonstrate in my paper.
I am also skeptical of its desirability. In defending the need for legislative protection for
religious behavior, Professor Smith argues that the good that religion does outweighs the
bad. Id. at 495-501. I would find the balance between the light and dark sides of religion to
be closer than Professor Smith suggests, in terms of the historical record, and the possibility
of disentangling them more problematic.
The political concern to promote religion as a good is in large part the fruit of the history
of disestablishment in the West. It is only when there is a separation of church and state and
of religion and culture that religion becomes a thing which can be considered good or bad.
Such an instrumental view of religion-one that emerged in the Enlightenment-is highly
specific to that religious and political context and fails to accurately represent religion in a
radically pluralistic society. (It is also one which I think people who identify themselves as
religious should be wary of because it subordinates religion to the needs of the state)
Professor Smith, in section V of his article, attempts to distinguish between religion which is
enculturated and religion that is not. Id- at 505-07. I do not believe that that distinction can
be fairly or accurately maintained. All religion is enculturated.
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